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In this reply, the authors explore several issues raised by I. Kirsch (2004) concerning their original article
(S. Stewart-Williams & J. Podd, 2004), which dealt with the roles of expectancy and classical condi-
tioning in the placebo effect. The only notable disagreement concerns a definitional issue, namely,
Stewart-Williams and Podd’s claim that the placebo concept can be extended to inert psychotherapies.
The authors defend this claim against the criticisms Kirsch raised. In addition, they comment on the
suggestion that nonconscious learning processes play only a small role in human placebo effects, arguing
that there are theoretical reasons to expect these processes to be more important than has previously been
recognized.
The main goal of our original article (Stewart-Williams & Podd,
2004) was to resolve the debate between the two major approaches
to the placebo effect: expectancy theory and classical conditioning.
In his commentary on this article, Kirsch (2004) discussed the
relationship between these approaches. His position is largely
consistent with our own, and therefore we have little to say in
response to this aspect of the commentary. Our only comment
concerns Kirsch’s suggestion that classical conditioning is in-
cluded as a component of expectancy theory. Although we agree
that conditioning is one cause of expectancy change, we would
emphasize that it cannot be wholly subsumed by expectancy
theory, as there are some instances of conditioning that do not
involve expectancies (as Kirsch, 2004, recognized). Aside from
this small point, the main focus of our reply is the question of
placebo psychotherapies. We also briefly consider the issue of
nonconscious learning in the placebo effect.
Placebo Psychotherapies
According to Kirsch (2004), there are two main problems with
extending the term placebo to cover psychotherapies. One relates
to the fact that psychological problems are often caused by peo-
ple’s beliefs and expectations and, consequently, that any success-
ful treatment of these problems is likely to be mediated by a
change in beliefs or expectancies. His concern is that if the
possibility of a psychotherapy placebo were allowed, this would
mean that many legitimate treatments would be relegated to the
category of placebo. The treatments he has in mind are those in
which “the active mechanisms match those that have caused the
problem in the first place” (Kirsch, 2004, p. 342), that is, condi-
tioning procedures, beliefs, and expectancies. Thus, the assump-
tion appears to be that if the possibility of psychotherapy placebos
is accepted, any psychotherapeutic technique that involves condi-
tioning or works through changing beliefs or expectancies would
be dismissed as a “mere” placebo. Behavior therapy would be a
placebo because it utilizes conditioning procedures, and cognitive
therapy would be a placebo because it works by changing people’s
beliefs.
If we had defined placebos in terms of the mechanisms under-
lying placebo effects (e.g., expectancies), then Kirsch would be
right: Many psychotherapy procedures would be inappropriately
classed as placebos simply because they work via expectancy
change. However, the key ingredient in our definition was not
mechanisms but inherent causal powers. We defined a placebo as
a substance or procedure that has no inherent power to bring about
a particular effect (Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004). If a proce-
dure has the inherent power to bring about an effect, then it is not
a placebo, regardless of the mechanisms through which the effect
is achieved. Therefore, the fact that cognitive therapy works by
changing people’s beliefs and expectancies does not imply that it
is a placebo. The question is whether this change is part of the
inherent action of the therapy; in the case of cognitive therapy,
presumably it is. On the other hand, if a procedure works only
because it is expected to, it is a placebo—not because it is medi-
ated by expectancies, but because it is not attributable to the
inherent powers of the procedure. A person undergoing a com-
pletely different procedure but with the same expectancies would
experience the same outcome. As such, there would be no useful
sense in which the cause of this outcome could be located in the
procedure.
Another criticism of our definition centers on Kirsch’s (2004)
claim that most psychotherapies would have no therapeutic effects
if the individuals undergoing them did not have an understanding
of the purpose and rationale of the therapy. As an example, he
suggested that free association would not be beneficial for some-
one from a culture with no knowledge of psychoanalysis and no
inkling that the purpose of this practice was to ameliorate distress.
The implication is that the recipient’s beliefs about the purpose and
rationale of a therapy are integral to that therapy; consequently, the
notion of the inherent effects of a psychotherapeutic technique—
effects unrelated to an individual’s beliefs about it—is problem-
atic. In fact, from Kirsch’s perspective, there are no such effects.
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It is not clear, though, that a proven psychotherapy would only
work under the conditions Kirsch (2004) specified. We admit that
the idea that free association would work in the absence of any
knowledge of psychoanalysis seems implausible. But perhaps this
is simply because it seems implausible that this technique has any
inherent power to relieve psychological distress. If free association
worked for the reasons Freud (1900/1954) thought it did, then
presumably it would work in the absence of any understanding of
its purpose. Similarly, if systematic desensitization works as a
result of pairing a feared stimulus with relaxation, then presumably
this effect is not contingent on an understanding of this rationale or
on the expectation of a therapeutic effect. Without such an under-
standing or expectation, it might be difficult to persuade people to
engage in a psychotherapeutic procedure. But this is true also of
proven medical procedures and does not undermine the claim that
such procedures have the power to produce effects through their
inherent nature rather than through a belief or expectation related
to the procedure. Of course, the expectation of an effect might lead
to a stronger effect. However, if the cause of this latter contribution
cannot be traced to the procedure, it should be classed as a placebo
component and distinguished from the active components.
Kirsch is right to want to avoid the conclusion that all psycho-
therapies are placebos. However, his solution—which does not
allow for any distinction between genuine psychotherapies and
placebo psychotherapies—forces one to the equally undesirable
conclusion that all possible psychotherapies are effective, no mat-
ter how outlandish or irrelevant. The criterion of inherent causal
powers allows us to adopt an intermediate position, a position that
avoids either extreme: Some psychotherapy procedures are inher-
ently effective and some are placebos.
Nonconscious Learning in the Placebo Effect
Finally, we would like to comment on the role of nonconscious
learning processes in the placebo effect. Kirsch (2004) down-
played the importance of these processes, noting, for instance, that
we were only able to provide empirical support for one noncog-
nitively mediated placebo effect. Although this is true, there is
some reason to think that nonconscious contingency learning may
be more important than the existing placebo research suggests.
According to Kirsch (2004), the “adaptive advantage of cognition
is increased response flexibility,” and “to convey that benefit . . . it
must be capable of overriding the influence of simpler automatic
processes” (p. 342). Admittedly, it does appear that the selective
pressures facing our ancestors have resulted in a higher degree of
behavioral flexibility in our species than is found in any other
(although we should avoid thinking that more flexibility is always
better than less—often the reverse is true; see Anders, 1994;
Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Nonetheless, there are likely to be
limits to the extent that cognition can override automatic, noncon-
scious processes. If such processes had not continued to be evo-
lutionarily useful over the course of human cognitive evolution, it
is quite possible that humans would no longer possess them, just as
some bird species no longer possess the ability to fly because
flying ceased to be useful for them. Thus, the mere fact that
humans do possess these nonconscious learning processes suggests
that they may still be significant in our species. This provides a
theoretical reason to think that further empirical research may
show that such processes make an important contribution to phar-
macological placebo effects in humans.
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